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MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE LAW: IGNORING THE LESSONS FROM 
KING REX  
 






Following a review in 2013, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) established the 
Uninsured Drivers Agreement (UDA) 2015. The aim was to implement aspects 
of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID). The UDA 2015 contained 
numerous errors in its drafting and led to widespread criticism due to its 
incompatibility with EU law and common law principles. In January 2017 the 
MIB provided its Supplementary Uninsured Drivers Agreement. If its aim was 
to remedy these problems we argue that it has substantially failed. Further, the 
updated Agreement continues the uncertainty of the law in this area and, with 
reference to Fuller’s ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’, we present an argument 
that the Secretary of State for Transport should again redraft the UDA 2015 and 
the 2017 Supplement to provide legal certainty, remove the inconsistencies 
between national and EU law, and provide the protection to which third-party 
victims of uninsured drivers are entitled under EU law. 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
 
Motor vehicle insurance in the UK is governed through statutory and extra-
statutory provisions. The statute (the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88)) imposes 
duties to insure vehicles on a road or other public place, including requirements 
on insurance protection in the event that an individual is a victim of a negligent 
uninsured or untraced driver. The RTA88 provides protection for the third-party 
victims of uninsured drivers through (for example) enabling their claims directly 
against the policyholder’s insurers, but, in the event of the driver being 
uninsured, extra-statutory provisions1 take over. Through the extra-statutory 
arrangements a third-party victim may recover compensation in the event that 
either the insurer is not contractually nor statutorily liable to compensate the 
victim, or that the individual causing the accident cannot be traced.  
 
The national law governing motor vehicle insurance is also subject to EU law 
in the form of a series of six directives,2 collectively referred to as the motor 
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1 The Cassel Committee (Cmnd 5528) in 1937, having reviewed the motor insurance 
legislation, recommended that a deficiency in the Acts be remedied through the creation of a 
central fund through which the third-party victims of uninsured drivers would be able to 
recover damages. Thereafter the government established an Agreement, in 1945, with the 
insurance industry, through a Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB), to undertake this central 
guarantee fund role. Presently, the MIB assumes the position of insurer for third-party victims 
of accidents caused by uninsured and untraced drivers.  
2 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
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vehicle insurance directives (MVID). The sixth MVID is a consolidating directive 
and therefore unless otherwise specified, this directive contains the provisions 
governing the law since its enactment in 2009. Through the MVID member 
states are obligated to establish a fund from which victims of uninsured3 and 
untraced4 motor vehicles and/or their drivers can obtain compensation. These 
responsibilities were to be designated to a central body and in the UK, the 
Government (through the Secretary of State for Transport) and the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau (a private company which has entered into a series of 
agreements with the UK – (MIB)) satisfy this requirement. In this regard, the 
MIB acts as an insurer of last resort5 through the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
(UDA), most recently of 2015 with a supplementary UDA in 2017, and an 
Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (UtDA), most recently updated and given effect 
from March 2017. 
 
Due to the relationship between the MVID and the UK’s transposing legislation 
and the MIB Agreements, these national laws are subject to the jurisprudence 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Further, they must be 
interpreted, as far as is possible,6 in accordance with the MVID. Given these 
parameters for transposition, interpretation and application of the law, the 
certainty necessary for citizens to understand the rights and obligations created 
through both sources is provided. In relation to the CJEU, legal certainty may 
be argued from a black-letter law perspective, aligned with predictability. 7 
Predictability is joined with rationally acceptable adjudications (in terms of 
solutions or outcomes) in ensuring the content of the law is determined and 
expressed as either a directly applicable measure or that it is used consistently 
in the CJEU’s interpretation and decisions. As such, both legal certainty and 
the principle of justice must be present in legal issuance and its application.  
                                                 
vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ 
L103/1; (the) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17; (the) Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 2000/26/EC on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (the Fourth Motor 
Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (the Fifth Directive) Directive 2005/14/EC amending 
Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 
2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil 
liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [2005] OJ L149/14; and (the Sixth Directive) 
Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] OJ 
L263/11. 
3 A driver who caused or contributed to the accident and who, at the time held no valid policy 
of insurance, but who is identified. 
4 A driver deemed responsible for the accident and who leaves the scene without identifying 
him/herself and cannot be traced. 
5 Every insurer operating a business incorporating the underwriting of compulsory motor 
insurance is required to be a member of the MIB (RTA88, ss 95, 143 and 145(2)). 
6 As per Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 
Kreisverband Walshut eV [2004] ECR I-8835; Cases C-10-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v 
IN.CO.’90 Srl [1998] ECR I-6307 at [21]; and Case C-314/08 Krzysztof Filipiak, 19 November 
2009 at [18]. 
7 Although this approach may lead to a less than complete answer to certainty. 
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LEGAL CERTAINTY: THE MIB, ITS AGREEMENTS AND 
INTERPRETATION 
 
The CJEU, 8  adopting a Cartesian philosophy, 9  has confirmed that legal 
certainty10 is a fundamental principle of EU law and imposes upon member 
states a requirement for transparency, precision, stability and predictability in 
law-making. 11  It assists in avoiding injustice 12  and imposes order on 
permissible actions, including rule-making and law-applying activities.13 In the 
dealings between the Secretary of State and the MIB in the creation of the UDA 
and UtDA, these principles almost seem to have been ignored. Further, the 
Government’s recent White Paper14 on the Great Repeal Bill and the legal 
transition in exiting the EU, has raised further issues of certainty – particularly 
present in the decision-making of the Court of Appeal and its adherence (or 
not) with the jurisprudence of the CJEU. 
 
The focus of this article is the critique of the main problems which exist in the 
Supplementary UDA 2017 (continuing and leaving unaltered several problems 
still present in the UDA 2015), and specifically a continuation of the MIB’s self-
exclusion of liability and in the administrative arrangements incorporated into 
the Agreement (imposed on those who use it). In the allegory of King Rex, 
Fuller15  outlines the eight principles of internal morality which are inherent 
qualities of a legal system. Problems exist in Rex’s well-intentioned (but 
doomed) attempts to establish a fair system of legal rules based on codes and 
precedent (as legislator and judge). Establishing and maintaining ‘a system of 
legal rules may miscarry [fail] in at least eight ways; there are… eight distinct 
                                                 
8 From Case C-236/95 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:341 ‘the 
Court has consistently held that it is particularly important, in order to satisfy the requirement 
for legal certainty, that individuals should have the benefit of a clear and precise legal 
situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to 
rely on them before the national courts.’ at [13].  
9 Although recently van Meerbeeck has argued that this form of legal certainty could be 
replaced with a fiduciary logic based on trust. See J van Meerbeeck ‘The Principle of Legal 
Certainty in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice: From Certainty to Trust’ (2016) 
41(2) European Law Review 275. 
10 A term first used by the CJEU in Cases 42, 49/59 Société nouvelle des usines de Pontlieue 
- Aciéries du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community [1961] ECR 53. 
11 See Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer [1984] ECR 1075 at 1086; Case 169/80 
Administration des Douanes v Société Anonyme Gondrand Freres and Societe anonyme 
Garancini [1981] ECR 1931; Case C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v 
Commission [2006] ECR I-5479 at 69; and Case C-67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra v 
Commission [2010] ECR I-09811 at [77]. 
12 See J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999) for discussion of how injustice is avoided through a clarity of content, 
effectiveness and enforcement. 
13 Bertelsmann Stiftung ‘2014 Rule of Law Report Legal Certainty, Judicial Review, 
Appointment of Justices, Corruption Prevention’ Sustainable Governance Indicators. 
14 Department for Exiting the European Union (2017) ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union’ Cm 9446 (available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications). 
15 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91. 
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routes to disaster.’16 The eight ways are 1) A failure to achieve rules (every 
decision is made on an ad hoc basis with no generality); 2) a failure to make 
available the rules which parties are expected to observe; 3) the abuse of 
retroactive legislation; 4) a failure to make clear rules; 5) the enactment of 
contradictory rules; 6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the 
affected party (they are impossible to perform); 7) introducing such frequent 
changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action to them; and 8) a 
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration. Fuller concludes on this point that ‘total failure in any one of 
these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all…’17 For Fuller, the 
‘eights ways to fail to make law’ were self-evident, applying as they did to a 
legal system – they are obvious in respect of the context of the frame of 
reference to which they are applied.18 Whilst the MVID and the UDA 2015 do 
not constitute a legal system as applied in the King Rex allegory, they form a 
significant aspect of motor insurance law relating to the protection of innocent 
victims of negligent uninsured drivers. Further in the article, we identify the 
examples in which the MIB and Secretary of State have ‘failed to make law’ in 
at least three aspects of Fuller’s ‘eight ways.’ 
 
Giving effect to the legal and procedural rights provided through the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the contents of the MVID, via the transposing 
national UDA, and their interpretation by the courts and dispute-resolving 
arbitrators, has proved to be contentious and fraught with errors.19 This has led 
to a system of uncertainty, far exceeding lexical ambiguity, guarantees from EU 
law not being met, and, we argue, a situation where a cancelling and re-writing 
of the most recent Supplementary UDA 2017 and the UDA 2015 is necessary 
to meet the legitimate expectations20 of all involved in motor vehicle insurance. 
It is also in the application of the procedural requirements embedded in the 
UDA where questions may be raised of its adherence to principles of justice.21 
 
For Dicey, certainty of law (as part of the rule of law) is guaranteed not only by 
the law-makers, but also the courts in the definition, application and 
enforcement of the law. At the EU level, certainty is based on the German 
doctrine and jurisprudence ‘Dispositionssicherheit’ - the ‘personal freedom to 
decide and develop oneself, made possible… by the predictability of the whole 
legal framework.’ 22  However, conflicts exist between, on the one hand, 
                                                 
16 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91, 93. 
17 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91, 93. 
18 For further discussion of this point see P Popelier ‘Legal Certainty and the Principles of 
Proper Law Making’ (2000) European Journal of Law Reform 321. 
19 See J Marson, K Ferris, and A Nicholson ‘Irreconcilable differences? The Road Traffic Act 
and the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives’ (2017) The Journal of Business Law 1, 
51. 
20 K D Logue ‘Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain’ (2007) 27 
Virginia Tax Review 241, 248. 
21 This is particularly so with regards the finality of civil proceedings with the compulsory use 
of a paper-based system of arbitration when appealing a decision of the MIB. 
22 P Popelier ‘Legal Certainty and the Principles of Proper Law Making’ (2000) European 
Journal of Law Reform 321, 327. 
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certainty, and on the other justice. Insurers, policyholders and the innocent 
third-party victims of negligent drivers require that the law is certain, but also 
that justice is available through the EU and transposing national instruments. 
Legal certainty aligns with tenets such as uniformity, predictability and non-
arbitrariness, while justice may involve exceptions to these principles as it 
necessitates adaptability. Both are features of a just legal system, and hence 
require a balanced, nuanced approach to their adoption and promotion. The 
interpretation necessary of the UDA 2015 and Supplementary UDA 2017 in the 
spirit of the MVID on which it is based, and to whose provisions it must adhere, 
is an issue which is likely to affect the certainty of law.  
 
Legal certainty, in isolation, of course consists of inherent weakness. The 
openness of law, its open sphere, empowers the judiciary with authority to 
create new laws in similar fashion to a legislator (adopting what Kelsen refers 
to as a ‘free discretion’).23 Even where correctness exists within the framework 
of the legal system, this does not necessarily result in predictability for citizens. 
For example, the House of Lords was in White v White24 faced with interpreting 
cl 6 of the UDA 1999 (the exclusions to liability permissible to the MIB). Whilst 
the Lords interpreted these consistently and correctly25 with reference to the 
MVID and the judgments of the CJEU, these sources did not constitute a 
dictionary definition nor a literal interpretation of the content of the legislative or 
judicial issuance. As such, the uncertainty present in that Agreement would 
have led to an average person to have been mistaken as to the extent and 
meaning of cl 6 without access to legal advice or a strong sense of their own 
ability to purposively interpret national law / rules with the EU parent. The 
lessons from the UDA 1999 regarding the need for clarity, and that here the 
rule as announced and its actual administration was incongruent, could lead to 
Fuller’s eighth way to fail to make law. 
 
The Secretary of State and the MIB have updated the Agreement on the issue 
of uninsured drivers in 1999, 2015 and most recently in 2017. The 1999 
Agreement has effect between the 13 August 1999 to 2 July 2015 and the 2015 
Agreement applies from 3 July 2015 (albeit subject to deletions of cll 7 and 9 
as from the 1 March 2017). The legacy of these Agreements has the 
consequence that individuals affected during these dates are subject to the 
Agreement in place at the time. They do not repeal the previous Agreement 
and therefore, for example, anyone so affected by a clause in the UDA 2015 
occurring before 1 March 2017 would still be affected by the breaches in that 
Agreement, despite the removal of two of the EU-offending clauses through the 
Supplementary UDA 2017. As such, legacy breaches may still continue to 
adversely affect a third-party victim, despite any update in a subsequent 
Agreement. 
 
THE EU AND CERTAINTY 
 
The MIB acts as the insurer of last resort for the innocent victims of identified 
                                                 
23 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law. Translation from the Second German Edition by Max Knight 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 349. 
24 [2001] UKHL 9. 
25 Other aspects of the judgment were incorrect as to the requirements of the MVID. 
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uninsured drivers. Here the victim claims compensation for his/her injuries from 
the MIB as if the uninsured driver was insured, 26  via the UDA 2015 (as 
amended by the Supplementary UDA 2017). The certainty of the Agreements 
relate to what it means and is understood by the average person (or indeed 
lawyer and judge) and hence how this affects the person’s behaviour and ability 
to orientate their behaviour.  
 
According to Dworkin, certainty is increased in advanced legal systems that are 
‘thick with constitutional rules and practices, and dense with precedents and 
statutes…’27 It cannot be justifiably argued that motor vehicle insurance is not 
replete with rules, practices, precedents and statutes to guide citizens, 
organisations and the legislators in adhering to the underlying requirements to 
facilitate the free movement principles upon which they are founded. However, 
this has not increased certainty nor prevented the subjectivity in the 
transposition of EU rules by the UK. It was in SIAT28 where the CJEU, when 
addressing the compatibility between a Treaty Article and national law, 
commented with reference to the lack of objectivity in the application of the 
national rules. It remarked that, in failing to satisfy the requirements of legal 
certainty, the lack of precision ‘… does not make it possible, at the outset, to 
determine its scope with sufficient precision and its applicability remains a 
matter of uncertainty.’29 The national provision in question was not ‘… clear, 
precise and predictable as regards their effects, in particular where they may 
have unfavourable consequences for individuals and undertakings’30 (authors’ 
emphasis). Further, the CJEU held that with regards to the free movement 
principles, ‘… a rule which does not meet the requirements of the principle of 
legal certainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives 
pursued.’31 
 
The inconsistency between national and EU law spans both judicial 
interpretations and the statutory and extra-statutory provisions. Hence, 
specifically in relation to the UDA 2015 and the Supplementary UDA 2017, the 
MIB and Secretary of State had the opportunity to redress the previous 
incompatibilities and uncertainty of the law,32 and at the very least, to remove 
the misleading and conflicting content of the Agreement remaining following the 
supplementary update. There are many aspects of the Agreements which are 
seemingly contrary to EU law requirements. The focus of this article, however, 
is the content of the UDA 2015 which outlines permissible exclusions of liability 
of the MIB in relation to uninsured drivers and aspects of the application of 
certain procedural rules, and the failure to remedy these in the Supplementary 
                                                 
26 The MIB will attempt to recover any disbursement from the uninsured driver. 
27 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), 286.  
28 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415. 
29 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415 at [57]. 
30 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415 at [58]. 
31 Case C-318/10 Societe d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v Etat belge 
EU:C:2012:415 at [59]. 
32 See N Bevan ‘Part II: Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 Needs to be Scrapped’ 






To reiterate, the MVID is designed with the intention of protecting the third-party 
victims of uninsured drivers or of untraced vehicles through providing 
compensation at the level they could expect to receive in a claim against an 
identified and insured driver. To ensure harmonization of the law, member 
states are required to give effect to the directives and are restricted from actions 
which would undermine the objectives of the directives or to make access to 
their provisions more difficult than under comparable national law. 
 
There are many examples where the courts have failed to give effect to the 
MVID through the national laws and have thus failed to provide certainty to this 
aspect of motor vehicle insurance.33 Here, the judiciary’s interpretation of the 
UDA 2015 inherently lacks the second-order correctness34 of content required 
under the MVID and transgresses the norms of free movement, underpinning 
the Treaties. The UDA 2015 and UDA 2017 both distort the meaning of the 
MVID in significant ways and this is exacerbated when the MIB and Secretary 
of State prepare an updated/supplementary Agreement which seemingly 
addresses problems contained in the previous document. If we concentrate on 
the exclusions of liability to which the MIB is responsible, as contained in the 
UDA 2015, it is quite evident how confusion is present and individuals may not 
have certainty in determining the national provisions when compared with the 
EU parent directives. The areas where the MIB exempts itself from 
responsibility to act as insurer of last resort are identified in cll 4-10 UDA 2015. 
The most egregious transgressions are identified below and are compared with 
the MVID and the requirements established at EU law. 
 
The UDA 2015 cl 5 exempts the MIB from being liable for a claim arising out of 
the use of a vehicle which is not, itself, required to be covered by a contract of 
insurance (unless its use is (actually) covered by such an insurance policy). 
Whilst it is widely understood that cars lawfully used on a road or other public 
place must be subject to minimum insurance cover, certain vehicles, in 
accordance with the RTA88 s 144, are exempt. For example, vehicles owned 
or in the possession of organizations such as the National Health Service, the 
police force and local authorities would not require insurance cover as any claim 
should be met through them directly rather than through the MIB. This is 
problematic insofar as compatibility with the Sixth MVID is concerned. Article 3 
of the MVID provides for the compulsory insurance of vehicles in member states 
and at Article 5, there exists a derogation from the obligation in respect of 
                                                 
33 See cases including Delaney v Pickett [2012] PIQR P10, [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 and EUI v 
Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
34 In Alexy’s thesis, correctness of content is concerned with practical questions, such as 
what is instructed, prevented and permitted apart from norms issued in the positive law. Here 
Alexy establishes two levels/stages of correctness of content – first-order and second-order. 
First-order correctness refers to an ideal dimension of justice. Second-order correctness 
adopts a more all-encompassing role incorporating legal certainty and justice. The second-
order correctness introduces a balancing between legal certainty as a formal principle and 
justice as a material/substantive principle. (R Alexy ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ 
(2008) 21 Ratio Juris 281. 
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compulsory insurance of vehicles. However, member states are still tasked with 
taking all appropriate measures to ensure civil liability in respect of the use of 
vehicles is covered by insurance. Clause 5 of the UDA 2015 is in breach of the 
MVID by enabling the insurer of last resort/guarantee fund body to avoid its 
liability to third-party victims in the event of injury caused by an uninsured driver. 
 
UDA 2015, at cl 6, permits the MIB to avoid liability or to deduct payments to a 
third-party victim of an uninsured driver. Such payments include those the 
victim would be entitled to receive through accident insurance payments or via 
compensation, and are subject to given exclusions. The exclusions 35  are 
contrary to rights held at common law and the distinction between the rights 
available through a claim via the MIB Agreements and those at common law 
have been held unlawful.36 Whilst the sixth MVID does enable member states 
to make deductions from the compensation payment made to a third-party 
victim, this is included to prevent the situation of the double payment of 
compensation (for example where the claimant has been in receipt of a 
payment through a state-run benefits system or who may have recovered funds 
through a compensation scheme and who then seeks an award through the 
MIB Agreement). The only permissible exclusion against the payment of 
compensation allowed through the sixth MVID is ‘in respect of persons who 
voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury when the 
body can prove that they knew it was uninsured.’ 37  Clause 6 UDA 2015 
exceeds this limitation and breaches the MVID.  
 
Clause 7 allows the MIB to avoid liability for damage to vehicles on the basis 
that, at the material time when the damage was caused, there was no contract 
of insurance for the use of the vehicle and, the claimant knew this or ought to 
have reason to believe no valid insurance was in place. The issue of the 
claimant’s (perceived) knowledge is referred to as ‘constructive knowledge’ and 
is also a feature of cl 8. Clause 8 applies to situations where a victim, as a 
passenger in a vehicle in which the driver was responsible for the accident, 
attempts to claim against the driver or anyone else who may be responsible for 
the driver’s use of the vehicle. The MIB avoids liability for the claim where the 
claimant voluntarily allowed themselves to be a passenger in the vehicle and 
either before the start of the journey, or after it starts,38 the passenger (as 
victim) knew or had reason to believe that it had been stolen, unlawfully taken, 
or was being used without a contract of insurance being in place. This 
phraseology was used in previous incarnations of the UDA39 and even despite 
minor changes between the wording used in the 199940 and 201541 UDAs, 
along with the removal of the EU-offending ‘crime exemption’42 of the MIB to 
victims who had knowingly allowed themselves to be carried in vehicles which 
were used in the furtherance of a crime, the clauses breach Art. 10(2) of the 
                                                 
35 From the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and an employer’s non-insured 
refundable advance. 
36 White v White [2001] UKHL 9 at [34]. 
37 Art. 10(2). 
38 For instance, if the victim could reasonably be expected to have alighted from it. 
39 Clause 6 UDA 1999. 
40 ‘… ought to have known.’  
41 ‘… had reason to believe.’ 
42 Delaney v Secretary of State [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
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sixth MVID.43 The MVID requires ‘proof’ of knowledge by the victim. Even the 
House of Lords extending actual knowledge to purposefully not enquiring44 
about the existence of insurance breached the MVID as no similar provision is 
contained in the directive. 
 
Clause 9 of the UDA 2015, despite its brevity, has potentially profound 
implications for third-party victims of uninsured drivers. The clause reads: ‘[The] 
MIB is not liable for any claim, or any part of a claim, where the death, bodily 
injury or damage to property was caused by, or in the course of, an act of 
terrorism within the meaning of s 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.’45 The result was 
an exemption for the MIB to have to settle claims in those specific 
circumstances.46 Problems were caused with the definition of ‘terrorism’ being 
based on that included in the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000.47 It was unusual and 
indeed unnecessary for the inclusion of this clause given that the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence exempted the MIB from being required to satisfy a claim against 
an uninsured vehicle which use did not constitute a normal use of a vehicle.48 
In another article49 we outlined the hypothetical situations which use of TA 2000 
s 1 could lead to (for example a third party victim of a road traffic accident 
caused by an uninsured driver of a car fleeing the scene of his arsonist attack 
having killed victims employed at an anti-GM crop facility). Another third-party 
victim of an accident caused by an uninsured driver not involved in a terrorist 
act would, by contrast, be protected and have the claim dealt with by the MIB. 
 
Law should be accurate. In relation to the MVID, the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
clarifies many areas of contention with regards the RTA88 and the UDA. This 
is not to say that, of itself, the EU’s teleological approach to statutory 
interpretation creates certainty. The EU’s addition to the domestic interpretation 
of national law within the spirit of the EU parent can lead to ‘… a regime in 
which reliance and predictability are wholly subsumed to constant change and, 
correspondingly, an unstable legal framework.’50 However, uncertainty here 
does not refer to a lack of legislative provision in its implementation or judicial 
                                                 
43 Similar breaches when using ‘constructive knowledge’ apply to RTA88 151(4). 
44 White v White [2001] UKHL 9 at [34]. 
45 Although the use of this definition is not limited to the UDA 2015 – see for instance the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s 74; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 s 15; and 
the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 s 54. 
46 The ‘terrorism exclusion’ clause operates to void the MIB of liability in those specific 
circumstances and is a clause which began life in UtDA 2003 cl 5.1(g). 
47 For an of the Terrorism Act 2000 see C Gearty ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: A Case 
Study in Impending Legal Realities’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies, 367. 
48 The TA 2000 definition of terrorism is itself questionable as to its appropriateness for the 
various purposes to which it is applied – see C Walker, Terrorism and the Law (OUP, 2011). 
Further, in Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146, a case decided prior to the creation of the UDA 2015, the CJEU held 
that vehicles must be used for their intended purpose. Where this is not adhered to, use 
would be construed as ‘misuse’ and the MVID would not have effect. Therefore, no 
compulsory third-party insurance would be required and the MIB would have no role in any 
subsequent claim for damages. 
49 J Marson, and K Ferris ‘The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 as a Legitimate Source of 
Authority’ (2016) Statute Law Review, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmw043 where we 
outline the deficiencies in the Agreement with regards its compatibility with EU law. 
50 A L Tyler, ‘Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1389, 1418.  
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direction in its application. The uncertainty lies in the differing rules between the 
EU source and the UK national implementing measure, and in the definitive 
status provided to the MIB and its Agreement with the Secretary of State. For 
example, the interpretation provided by the judiciary in the UK holds the MIB 
not to have emanation of the State status. In light of authority from the CJEU, 
this position is questionable and not in conformity with EU jurisprudence.51   
 
THE SUPPLEMENTARY UNINSURED DRIVERS AGREEMENT 2017 
 
Following the establishing of the recent UDAs and UtDAs, public calls for a 
comprehensive review and subsequent changes to their content and scope 
were made.52 The MIB disagreed, considering that the provisions of the UDA 
were compatible with its legal requirements. Yet in 2017, it provided as a 
rationale for the Supplementary UDA ‘We understand that the government felt 
its hands were tied and they must comply with the [sixth MVID]; so both the 
[UDA and UtDA] have to change.’53 
 
The extent of the exclusions contained in the UDA 2015 were significant and 
articulated in clear terms breaches of the MVID. Beyond the judicial review54 
currently progressing in court brought by the charity RoadPeace which seeks 
rectification of the breaches in the UDA 2015 and the 2003 UtDA (this latter 
Agreement was more substantially updated in March 2017), the MIB and the 
Secretary of State sought to use this opportunity to update the UDA 2015. In 
so doing it has changed some of the wording to achieve parity with those used 
in the UtDA 2017, albeit this was a relatively minor series of changes.  
 
The Supplementary Agreement provides: 
 
‘2. This Agreement shall come into force on the 01 day of March 2017 
and applies to accidents occurring on or after that date. From that time 
onwards, the 2015 Agreement shall continue to apply in all respects 
save as provided for by the amendments set out below.  
                                                 
51 See a case involving the status of the MIB of Ireland; Case C‐356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I‐
3067. 
52 On the issue of the compatibility between national law and EU requirements in motor 
insurance law see the comprehensive work of Nicholas Bevan including: ‘Motor Insurance 
Law Change’ (2016) 166 NLJ 7703, 5; ‘Putting Wrongs to Rights (Pt 2)’ (2016) 166 NLJ 7701, 
13; ‘Putting Wrongs to Rights (Pt 1)’ (2016) 166 NLJ 7700, 17; ‘Redress Road’ (2016) 166 
NLJ 7700, 5; ‘Still Driving Dangerously’ (2016) 166 NLJ 7693, 18; ‘A Call for (More) Reform’ 
(2015) 165 NLJ 7661, 9; ‘No Through Road’ (2015) 165 NLJ 7648, 7; ‘Delaney Sets a New 
Insurance Route’ (2015) 165 NLJ 7644, 4; ‘High Impact’ (2014) 164 NLJ 7628, 5; ‘Ignore at 
Your Peril’ (2014) 164 NLJ 7628, 7; ‘Bad Law’ (2014) 164 NLJ 7624, 7; ‘UK in Breach Over 
Uninsured Drivers’ (2014) 164 NLJ 7610, 4; ‘Untraced Drivers' Scheme is Car Crash’ (2014) 
164 NLJ 7598, 4; ‘On the Right Road (Pt IV)’ (2013) 163 NLJ 193; ‘On the Right Road? (Pt 
III)’ (2013) 163 NLJ 160; ‘On the Right Road? (Pt II)’ (2013) 163 NLJ 130; ‘On the Right 
Road?’ (2013) 163 NLJ 94; ‘Asleep at the Wheel?’ (2013) 163 NLJ 7556, 10. 
53 https://www.mib.org.uk/media-centre/news/2017/january/new-untraced-drivers-agreement-
and-supplementary-uninsured-drivers-agreement/ (accessed 30 March 2017). 
54 R (on the application of RoadPeace) v Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB, Claim 
no. CO/4681/2015. 
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3. The whole of clauses 7 (vehicle damage) and 9 (terrorism) are omitted 
but, notwithstanding this, the numbering of the subsequent clauses 
remains unchanged.’  
 
Hence, cll 7 and 9 were both repealed from the UDA 2015 in the Supplementary 
UDA 2017. Both the UDA 1999 and 2015 excluded the MIB55 from having to 
settle claims against an uninsured driver where the claimant’s vehicle was also 
uninsured. Deleting this clause in the UDA 2017 prevents insurers dealing with 
claims on behalf of the MIB against an uninsured driver from refusing to meet 
a claim where the claimant’s vehicle was uninsured. Secondly, the terrorism 
exclusion which was misconceived from the outset has also been removed 
without recourse to further legal action (although it remains an aspect of the 
judicial review proceedings brought by RoadPeace).  
 
However, each of the existing clauses which operated in the UDA 2015 and 
have not been expressly deleted (cll 5,6 and 8) continue to breach the MVID 
and have not been addressed. Despite the Court of Appeal’s position in the 
recent case of Sahin v Havard 56  that the RTA88 and MIB Agreements 
collectively achieve the requirements of the MVID,57 these inconsistencies do 
nothing to improve legal certainty or give drivers, insurers and third-party 
victims adequate instruction as to their legal rights and obligations. Indeed, the 
application of the law in the courts does nothing to assist with remedying the 
current uncertainty.58 
 
Actions contrary to the legal certainty principle include provisions which are 
meaningless or irreconcilable with the content of other (EU) laws (including cll 
5,6 and 8 UDA 2015 and s 148(2) RTA88);59 where provisions are repealed or 
substantially altered (including cll 7 and 9 UDA after 1 March 2017 but whose 
application continues for incidents covered by the previous applicable UDA);60 
and where the issue is so complex that citizens would be unable to know the 
extent of the law (for example the current application of s 148(2) RTA88).61 
Each of these elements may be found in the exclusion clauses within the UDA 
2015. The Agreement frequently fails to provide authoritative issuance on 
significant matters clearly defined in the parent MVID and/or the deductive 
                                                 
55 And also any Art. 79 insurer acting as the agent of the MIB. Article 79 refers to that part of 
the MIB’s Articles of Association which provides: ‘Article 79 - Domestic Regulations. The 
purpose of the Domestic Regulations is to distribute amongst MIB Members, in an equitable 
fashion, the liabilities falling on the Central Fund, by imposing an obligation to meet a claim 
upon any Member that has a relationship with the risk. The obligations imposed by the 
Domestic Regulations may require a Member to meet claims even where no contractual 
relationship exists with the parties to the accident. Details of decisions taken by the Technical 
Committee upon cases falling within the Domestic Regulations are regularly circulated to 
Members.’ (available at https://www.mib.org.uk/media/311594/mib-member-application-form-
supporting-document-version-60.pdf). 
56 Sahin v Havard and Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202. 
57 See paras [8], [13], [16–28], [32], [33], and [34] of the judgment. 
58 J Marson, and K Ferris ‘Misunderstanding and Misapplication of Motor Insurance Law. Will 
the Supreme Court come to the Rescue?’ (2017) European Journal of Current Legal Issues 
(forthcoming). 
59 Establishing Fuller’s fifth failure to make law. 
60 Establishing Fuller’s seventh failure to make law. 
61 Establishing Fuller’s fourth failure to make law. 
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reasoning provided by the CJEU. Judgments made in accordance with the UDA 
2015 would fail the test of rational argumentation, and, as will be observed 
below, the application of the Agreement in accordance with procedural rules 
would lack the required adaptability (particularly in relation to the current status 
of the MIB as not constituting an emanation of the state) to provide justice. The 
Supplementary UDA 2017 and the UDA 2015 fail the dual nature of law.62 
 
THE GREAT REPEAL BILL 
 
Despite the assertion by the Government that the UK’s exit from the European 
Union (commonly referred to as Brexit) will establish greater certainty for, 
amongst others, the legal system, the White Paper63 introduced on 30 March 
2017 included details regarding the mechanism of the transition from EU law to 
national law. The Government proposes to convert the ‘acquis’ of EU law into 
national law on the coming into force of the Great Repeal Bill (read Act) 
following the repeal of the European Communities Act. Such an approach will 
see national law as supreme,64 that existing directly applicable EU laws (Treaty 
Articles and Regulations) will be subsumed into national law65 (via secondary 
legislation) and existing EU laws already transposed into national law will be 
preserved. 66  Provisions from Treaties which may be relied on directly in 
national courts (and hence have direct effect) will continue to be available67 
and, perhaps much more significantly in terms of motor vehicle insurance law, 
whilst the jurisdiction of the CJEU will be brought to an end, its historic 
jurisprudence will have the same binding precedence as decisions of the UK 
Supreme Court.68 
 
The Government, whilst acknowledging the potential problem of leaving the EU, 
its laws and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, sought to reassure readers of the 
White Paper. It provides examples of EU-based laws which will continue and 
interpretations of laws provided by the CJEU which will also continue to be used 
in the post-Brexit era in an attempt to provide certainty and clarity of the law.69 
At paragraphs 2.16 and 2.17 the White Paper continues its assessment of the 
implications of previous CJEU decisions. It identifies that adherence to, and the 
                                                 
62 For discussion of this theoretical position see R Alexy ‘The Dual Nature of Law’ (2010) 23 
Ratio Juris 167, 167. 
63 Department for Exiting the European Union (2017) ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union’ Cm 9446 (available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications). 
64 Para. 2.3. 
65 Para. 2.4. 
66 Para. 2.5. 
67 Para. 2.11. 
68 Paras 2.12-2.17. 
69 The EU Council clearly does not agree with the UK’s positive perception of the impending 
legal certainty following the Brexit notification: ‘The United Kingdom's decision to leave the 
Union creates significant uncertainties that have the potential to cause disruption, in particular 
in the UK but also in other Member States. Citizens who have built their lives on the basis of 
rights flowing from the British membership of the EU face the prospect of losing those rights. 
Businesses and other stakeholders will lose the predictability and certainty that come with EU 
law.’ European Council ‘(Art. 50) (29 April 2017) - Draft Guidelines following the United 
Kingdom's Notification under Article 50 TEU’ Brussels, 31 March 2017 (OR. en), XT 
21001/17, 2.  
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continuation of, the jurisprudence established by the CJEU is important as it 
maximizes legal certainty, but it does not want this intention to ‘fossilise the 
past decisions of the CJEU forever.’70 The Supreme Court will have the ability, 
derived from a practice statement made by the House of Lords in 1966 and 
adopted by the Supreme Court in 2010, to treat previous decisions as binding 
but with the ability to depart from these when it appears right to do so. At 
paragraph 2.17 the White Paper continues that the Government expects the 
Supreme Court to take a  
 
‘similar, sparing approach to departing from CJEU case law. We are also 
examining whether it might be desirable for any additional steps to be 
taken to give further clarity about the circumstances in which such a 
departure might occur. Parliament will be free to change the law, and 
therefore overturn case law, where it decides it is right to do so.’ 
 
This poses an interesting conundrum for the application of motor vehicle 
insurance law in post-Brexit Britain.71 Whilst the UK government will have the 
right to change EU-based laws following a review and submission to 
Parliament, on Brexit day the jurisprudence of the CJEU will take effect akin to 
a precedent established by the Supreme Court. By way of just one example, 
the problem for the UK’s compliance with the MVID will come starkly into focus. 
Section 148 RTA88 governs where insurers may and may not seek to avoid a 
contract of insurance. Following the supply of a certificate of insurance, there 
are eight ‘matters’ which, if attempted to be used by an insurer to avoid their 
liabilities, would be held void. The matters are contained in s 148(2) and relate 
to:  
 
(a) the age or physical or mental condition of persons driving the vehicle;  
(b) the condition of the vehicle;  
(c) the number of persons that the vehicle carries;  
(d) the weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the vehicle carries; 
(e) the time at which or the areas within which the vehicle is used; 
(f) the horsepower or cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; 
(g) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular apparatus; or 
(h) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other 
than any means of identification required to be carried by or under [the Vehicle 
Excise and Registration Act 1994]. 
 
The extent of the application of s 148(2) RTA88 was considered in EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership.72 The case involved an individual who, using his motor 
vehicle, attempted to commit suicide by driving into a building. In the course of 
this activity the driver damaged the property of another motorist. Under the 
terms of the contractual policy, the motor insurer had sought to exclude liability 
for ‘deliberate acts’ and therefore sought to avoid the claim of the third-party 
motorist who had suffered damage by the deliberate actions of the insured 
                                                 
70 Para. 2.16. 
71 For our interpretation of the possibilities see J Marson, K Ferris, and A Nicholson ‘Brexit 
means Brexit: What does it mean for the Protection of Third Party Victims and the Road 
Traffic Act 1988?’ (2017) Statute Law Review, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmx006. 
72 [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
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driver. The question to be considered by the Court of Appeal was whether such 
an attempted exclusion was permitted under s 148(2). This issue of national 
laws which seek to permit the exclusion of contractual liability in motor vehicle 
policies had been previously determined by the CJEU in Ruiz Bernaldez.73 The 
CJEU had confirmed that the only permissible grounds for excluding a third 
party’s right to claim against the policyholder’s insurers was where the third 
party knew that the vehicle was stolen 74  (this being the only permissible 
derogation from such insurance cover as outlined in the MVID). The 
Bernaldez75 reasoning was also confirmed in the later cases of Correia Ferreira 
v Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA, 76  Candolin v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola, 77  Farrell v Whitty, 78  and Churchill v 
Wilkinson and Tracey Evans.79 However, in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership80 
the Court of Appeal refused to follow the principles established in Bernaldez 
and held they were not of general application. In a unanimous judgment 
delivered by Ward LJ, the Court of Appeal concluded that as s 148(2) provided 
a finite list of matters, this should be interpreted as exhaustive rather than 
illustrative (as CJEU jurisprudence would require). 
 
Given the obligation that the jurisprudence of the CJEU will become the 
equivalent to precedent established by the Supreme Court, decisions such as 
that delivered in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership will no longer be able to 
disregard EU-compliant authority. It will, in essence, be overruled by the CJEU 
(now Supreme Court) authority in Bernaldez.81 The Court of Appeal, which has 
historically and more recently82  transgressed precedent established by the 
CJEU, will now be forced to comply with EU law. Evidently the Government 
may change the legislation, and it is not impossible to consider that the 
Government will have a new RTA prepared prior to Brexit or indeed one ready 
                                                 
73 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
74 The CJEU achieved this through purposively interpreting the list of void exclusions provided 
in Art.2(1) of the Second MVID (now contained in Art.13(1) of the Sixth MVID) as being 
illustrative and thereby extending the scope of the civil liability insurance requirement 
contained in Art.3(1) of the First MVID. 
75 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
76 Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECR 1-6711. 
77 Case C-537/03 Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhti&ouml Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta [2005] ECR I-5745. Here the 
court, when refering to Bernaldez (at [20]), commented that it had previously ‘… held that Art 
3(1) [of the MVID]… precludes an insurer from relying on statutory provisions or contractual 
clauses in order to refuse to compensate third-party victims of an accident caused by the 
insured vehicle.’ at [18]. 
78 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty (C-356/05) [2007] ECR I-3067.  
79 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy 
Evans v Equity Claims Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
80 [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
81 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
82 In Sahin v Havard and Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202 the Court of 
Appeal disregarded EU jurisprudence (and a decision held weeks before the judgment (Allen 
v Mohammed and Allianz Insurance (2016), Lawtel, LTL 25/10/2016) when interpreting ss. 
145, 143(1)(a) and 143(1)(b) RTA88. The Court of Appeal restrictively (and we argue 
incorrectly) interpreted RTA88 despite the second MVID providing the protection sought by 
the claimant. See J Marson, and K Ferris ‘Misunderstanding and Misapplication of Motor 
Insurance Law. Will the Supreme Court come to the Rescue?’ (2017) European Journal of 
Current Legal Issues (forthcoming). 
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to be enacted in the immediate aftermath, but pending such an eventuality, the 
landscape of motor vehicle insurance law is likely to change and whether this 
will establish legal certainty is at this stage still questionable. 
 
THE APPLICATION PROCESS UNDER THE MIB AGREEMENTS  
 
Road users and pedestrians in the UK are entitled to clear guidance regarding 
not only their rights in relation to compulsory insurance provisions but also the 
circumstances and extent to which public authorities may interfere with their 
rights. All claims are subject to procedural rules, but it is arguable that those 
applied to the MIB Agreements breach comparable measures through the Civil 
Procedure Rules (CPR) 1998.  
 
When making a claim to the MIB, an application form of eight pages must be 
completed. The depth of questions required to be answered of the claimant are 
quite different from those required under the RTA 1 claim notification form under 
the CPR.83 This requires the claimant’s personal details – name, address, 
occupation, national insurance number, vehicle details and accident details 
(including injury and medical information, any rehabilitation required and 
vehicle damage). Even in RTA 1 Section H, claims under the MIB scheme for 
uninsured cases merely requires details of the defendant (a brief description, 
their approximate age and sex) and their vehicle. RTA 1 Section L, detailing the 
funding of the claim, is limited to details of any conditional fee arrangement 
entered into, the existence of an insurance policy, or an agreement with a 
membership organization which will meet the claimant’s costs.  
 
The MIB claim form is considerably more detailed but it is in Section 12 where 
stark differences are evident. Here the claimant consents to the MIB and their 
representatives using his personal and sensitive information (including medical 
information and criminal convictions relevant to the claim);84 the release of all 
information to the MIB or its representatives from any source which the MIB 
believes may possess relevant information to the claim for compensation. This 
may include, but is not limited to, information requested from: the claimant’s 
employers (such as wage and other benefit/pension details, 
absence/attendance records, the full personnel file, and precise contract 
details); any government department (such as all applications for benefits, tax 
records, payments made, driving licence details including relevant 
endorsements); and insurance companies (including full details of any policies 
held, claims made, monies received).85 Further, in Section 12 the claimant 
explicitly authorizes any health professional with whom they have consulted at 
any time to provide the MIB or its representatives with any relevant information 
(this is all the claimant’s health records and notes) concerning their past, 
present, or anticipated future, physical or mental health.86 Finally, in the event 
that the claimant has provided personal data about a third party (other than any 
uninsured driver) as part of the claim, they purport to have obtained the freely 
                                                 
83 For low value personal injury claims in road traffic accidents (the value of which is between 
£1,000-£25,000). 
84 Clause 3. 
85 Clause 4. 
86 Clause 5. 
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given agreement of the individual(s) concerned to enable the MIB to use their 
personal data, including any sensitive personal data, where practicable.87 
 
The extent of the information required to be provided, and to which access must 
be given, is significant. It is open to question whether such information is 
necessary to enable the MIB to fulfil its duties under the Supplementary UDA 
2017, UDA 2015 and the MVID. The personal data to be surrendered greatly 
exceeds that which is needed to pursue a claim under the auspices of the CPR 
and even may be questionable with regards the individual’s right to privacy 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The respect for 
an individual’s private and family life requires no interference by a public 
authority except in accordance with the law. This includes, where it is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country; for the prevention of disorder or crime; for 
the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. Clearly, Art. 8 is by its nature open-ended, but its 
interpretation covers both negative, as well as positive88 obligations on the 
state. Key issues in question regarding the invoking of Art. 8 is the ‘necessity’ 
of the requirements of the MIB disclosures in Section 12 of the claim form. This 
is satisfied where any interference of the individual’s privacy corresponds to a 
pressing social need,89 and that the need is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
being pursued. Given the extent of the information provided, and when 
compared under equivalence to the CPR, it does not appear ex facie that such 
information is required to satisfy the pressing need of enabling a victim of an 
uninsured or untraced driver to claim from a central fund. When coupled with 
the compulsory requirement of arbitration with no right of appeal to higher 
courts, the presence of safeguards at national law which have generally 
prevented a breach of the proportionality principle of the measure being 
necessary in a democratic society, are uncertain.90 It could be argued to the 
contrary that the limitations on public finances91 requires the full and complete 
disclosure of the claimant’s private information to prevent unworthy claims; 
however, the RTA88 s 154 was designed to facilitate, rather than to reduce, the 
effectiveness of an individual recovering compensation to which they were 
entitled. The MVID also requires the individual to be provided compensation 
from the state fund and it is quite possible to mount an argument that the 
administration of the claim form required by the MIB could dissuade a genuine 




Returning to King Rex and his attempts to revise his legal code: 
                                                 
87 Clause 6. 
88 X and Y v The Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235. 
89 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
90 MS v Sweden (1997) 3 BHRC 248. 
91 R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Sofiane Kebeline [2002] 2 AC 366, 381: ‘In 
this area difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature between 
the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances it will be 
appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the 
judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or 
person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention.’ 
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‘The resulting code was a model of clarity, but as it was studied it 
became apparent that its new clarity had merely brought to light that it 
was honeycombed with contradictions. It was reliably reported that there 
was not a single provision in the code that was not nullified by another 
provision inconsistent with it.’92 
 
The legitimacy of the UDA 2015 and the Supplementary UDA 2017 as being 
compliant with the MVID has been an area of contention since their inception. 
The MVID and the jurisprudence of the CJEU have developed the law relating 
to third-party victims of uninsured drivers and untraced vehicles. This has, 
however, often been stunted through the Agreements between the Secretary 
of State and the MIB and national courts (notably the Court of Appeal). Law is 
a regulatory concept but, whilst unable to offer definitive solutions to each 
potentially unanswerable question, it at least has the ability to provide a method 
of determinacy. However, the Court of Appeal has on several occasions, 
refused to follow the reasoning of the CJEU on the interpretation and 
application of the MVID through its myopic view of national laws. Brexit has 
furthered the uncertainty of the law in two key aspects. First, the Government 
has announced that it will use Parliamentary powers to review existing EU laws 
and selectively remove those from national application which do not adhere to 
the Government’s strategy. Secondly, historic CJEU decisions will be 
incorporated in UK law and be considered of the same standing as judgments 
of the Supreme Court. As such, case law from the Bernaldez93 line of reasoning 
will, following Brexit-day, be binding on the Court of Appeal and decisions such 
as in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership94 will be unavailable to that national 
court. Either the Government will pre-empt such an eventuality and change the 
RTA in advance of Brexit or it will lead to many appeals to the Supreme Court 
to clarify national provisions from their historic EU lineage. 
 
The motor vehicle insurance laws in the UK are in a state of flux. This does not 
help any user or participant in this area. Of course, a level of uncertainty has to 
be found in all legal systems 95  and in their application, but legal and 
administrative inconsistencies affecting the UDA 2015 (and subsequently) its 
Supplementary UDA 2017 have been identified and discussed, and yet the 
Government and the courts are often failing to apply the law in conformity with 
superior EU law.96 A reading of the UDA 2015 reveals a succinct and clear 
outline of the breadth of the MIB’s liability and responsibility to third-party 
victims of an uninsured driver. However, it is a contradictory document when 
                                                 
92 L L Fuller ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’ (2000) reprinted in J Feinberg & J Coleman 
eds, Philosophy of Law, sixth edition 91, 92. 
93 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
94 EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
95 Legal rules often incorporate an element of unpredictability with the common use of the 
words such as ‘reasonable’ and ‘ordinary’. Typically, the greater the complexity of the code, 
the increased likelihood there is to be inconsistencies in its content and its application. 
96 See P Popelier ‘Legal Certainty and the Principles of Proper Law Making’ (2000) European 
Journal of Law Reform 321, 339. 
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considered in the light of its EU-law parent. Similarly, the RTA88 fails to 
correspond with the MVID in a number of areas.97 
 
The Secretary of State for Transport, the MIB and the UK executive (along with 
elements of the judiciary) have collectively failed to make the law of motor 
vehicle insurance clear and certain. Whether, as with King Rex, they were 
misguided but ultimately well intentioned when creating the national law is 
ambiguous. What is definite, however, is that, like King Rex, their actions were 
ultimately doomed. 
 
                                                 
97 For example, s 143 (the duty to insure breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of the sixth MVID.), s 145 
(the requirement of third-party insurance cover breaches Arts. 1 and 3 of the sixth MVID.), s 
148 (the limitations on certain exclusions within the holder’s insurance policy breaches Art. 3 
of the sixth MVID), s 150 (the private use of a vehicle breaches Arts. 3 and 12(1) of the sixth 
MVID), s 151(4) (the (constructive) knowledge of theft or unlawful taking of a vehicle 
breaches Art. 13.1 of the sixth MVID), s 152 (the exceptions to indemnity under s. 151 
breaches recital 15 of the sixth MVID), s 185 (the definition of a motor vehicle breaches Arts. 
1 and 3 of the sixth MVID), and s 192 (the definition of road or other public place breaches 
Arts. 1 and 3 of the sixth MVID). 
